





Trust, Accountability, and Higher Education
Abstract
The main topics of the article are two phenomena that play an important role in (modern) 
higher education: accountability and trust. The author claims that we should not carry 
out just any accountability but rather only intelligent accountability. The aim of this paper 
is to contribute to the knowledge about intelligent accountability. In this framework the 
author wants to illuminate the key importance of trust for cultivation of intelligent account­
ability, the “dialectic” between trust and accountability and the importance of the proper 
understanding of the university. He argues that trust in teachers and faith in educational 
institutions is a necessary condition for their proper functioning. This faith demands that we 
comprehend (educational) institutions as paradigms. The author concludes that the imple­
mentation of non­intelligent accountability in education is an important factor of develop­
ing of the economicist model of education which however is incompatible with the personal­
ist vision of education and society in general. Hence we should refute its implementation.
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higher education  it has become a means and a goal at  the  same  time. One 
aspect of  accountability –  the  aspect of  its means –  is  that  it  is  an obliga-
tion	to	explain,	to	report,	to	justify,	to	answer	how	the	resources	have	been	
spent,	for	what	purposes,	in	what	way	etc.	(Cf.	Trow	1996a)	The	goal	aspect	




























have	all	 the	necessary	 information,	 she	 trusts	a	particular	person,	group	or	
institution because this is the best strategy.
2

































The  idea  that  complete  control  and  checking  of  a  system  is  possible  is  a 
dangerous	 illusion.	System	measures	are	necessary	and	welcome	inasmuch	








trust	 is	 rational	 trust?	Here	 is	my	short	answer:	a	 rational	person	uses	sys-




there	 is	an	almighty	system	and	 that	we	can	achieve	 the	state	of	 total	 reli-
ance	where	no	trust	is	needed	is	irrational.	But	on	the	other	hand,	the	belief	









abolish	 them.	A	rational	person	 is	capable	of	recognising	 this	 line	between	
positive and negative effects of systemic measures.
























universities	and	of	 institutions	 in	general	provides	 the	context,	 the	horizon	
that	makes	such	belief,	such	“faith”	reasonable?
I	 think	 that	 the	account	of	universities	as	paradigms	 is	 such	view.	The	ex-






























































































exhausted)	 yet	 they	 can	 be	 imitated.	The	 proper	 relationship	 toward	 para-





















implies  less accountability  true?  In order  to be able  to provide a grounded 
answer	to	this	question	we	must	consider	the	origins	of	accountability	trend	
regarding education in more detail.
7. Origins of the accountability trend 














trust  in  it  has  decreased.  Some  of  them  think  that  the  present  educational 






similar  to  trust  in  a  scientific  research  pro-















siderable	 and	 interesting	 similarity	 between	
(scientific)  paradigm  and  tradition  (cf.  foot-
note	9).
9
For	more	 about	 the	 similarity	 between	 (sci-







aim of the accountability project  is  to increase trust  in national school sys-
tems,	including	higher	education	and	universities.	It	promises	also	to	increase	
equality in society by increasing the quality of public schools accessible to 
poor	 children	 and	 students,	 therefore	 being	 an	 essential	moment	 of	 the	 so	




































(stress  on  mathematics  and  literacy)  measured  by  standardised  tests.  Such 
approaches	reduce	the	space	of	education	which	suits	the	context-dependent	
needs	of	 students,	 reduce	 the	 importance	of	 social	 science	and	humanities,	
arts	and	music,	reduce	the	possibility	of	autonomous	creation	of	a	curriculum,	
and	 reduce	 the	 role	 of	 teachers	 to	mere	 instruments.	 In	 general	 terms,	 the	
more	accountability	account	does	not	bring	more	equality	and	equity,	quite	
















the  accountability  movement  has  often  undermined  this  morale  and  the  accompanying  trust 
quite	seriously.”
We	may	also	agree	with	Trow	 (1996a)	who	claims	 that	 accountability	 is	 a	
double	edged	sword.	While	on	one	hand	it	gets	good	press	in	certain	populist	







































lity  to  measure  all  the  (enduring)  effects  of 
education	 does	 not	 hinder	 us	 to	 learn	 what	

















































ing	and	protection.	These	values	are	 responsibility,	openness	 regarding	 the	
























There  is  another  interesting point  about  self-checking noticed by Strathern 


























the	other	side,	 the	 last	policies	from	the	Scottish	Executive	 indicate	a	shift	
from	the	top-down	systems	that	are	oriented	to	measures	and	comparing	at-
tainment,	 to	 approaches	 that	 give	more	 space	 to	 the	 teacher’s	 professional	
12




stralia,	 Africa,	 China,	 Eastern	 and	 Western	
Europe,	Latin	America,	United	States),	inter-






































8)	 We	 should	 support	 personalised13	 and	 flexible	 education	 (which	 corre-
sponds  to  specific  characteristics  of  concrete  educational  contexts  and 




















stimulates  the  accountability  approach  in  (and  to)  education;  on  the  other 
hand,	the	accountability	approach	stimulates	the	implementation	of	the	eco-
nomicist model.





















As	Nussbaum	 points	 out,	 for	 EM	 is	 characteristic	 not	 only	 the	 neglecting	
and	ignoring	of	humanities	and	art(s),	but	even	fear	of	them.	Education	for	










However,	 education	 systems	 all	 over	 the	world	 are	moving	 closer	 and	 closer	 to	 the	 growth	
model	without	much	thought	about	how	ill-suited	it	is	to	the	goals	of	democracy”	(op.	cit.,	24).
Conclusion
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Bojan Žalec
Povjerenje, odgovornost i visoko obrazovanje
Sažetak
Glavne teme ovog članka su dva fenomena koja igraju važnu ulogu u (modernom) visokom obra­
zovanju: odgovornost i povjerenje. Autor tvrdi da ne bismo smjeli provoditi bilo koji oblik od­
govornosti nego samo inteligentnu odgovornost. Cilj je rada doprinijeti znanju o inteligentnoj 
odgovornosti. U tom okviru autor nastoji rasvijetliti ključnu važnost povjerenja za kultiviranje 
inteligentne odgovornosti, »dijalektiku« između povjerenja i odgovornosti, te važnost ispravnog 
razumijevanja sveučilišta. On tvrdi da je povjerenje u nastavnike i vjera u obrazovne institucije 
nužan uvjet njihova ispravnog funkcioniranja. Ova vjera zahtijeva da obrazovne institucije shva­
ćamo kao paradigme. Autor zaključuje da je primjena ne­inteligentne odgovornosti u obrazovanju 
važan čimbenik razvoja ekonomističkog modela obrazovanja koji je nekompatibilan s personali­









Vertrauen, Verantwortlichkeit und Hochschulbildung
Zusammenfassung
Die Kernthemen dieses Artikels beziehen sich auf zwei Phänomene, die eine beträchtliche Rolle 
in der (modernen) Hochschulbildung spielen: Verantwortlichkeit und Vertrauen. Der Autor stellt 
die Behauptung auf, wir dürften nicht irgendeine Form der Verantwortlichkeit durchführen, 
sondern vorzugsweise nur die intelligente Verantwortlichkeit. Das Ziel des vorliegenden Papers 
heißt, das Wissen über die intelligente Verantwortlichkeit zu festigen. Im Rahmen dessen inten­
diert der Autor, die Schlüsselbedeutung des Vertrauens für die Kultivierung der intelligenten 
Verantwortlichkeit, die „Dialektik“ zwischen dem Vertrauen und der Verantwortlichkeit sowie 
die Wichtigkeit eines geziemenden Verständnisses der Universität zu durchleuchten. Er vertritt 
die Ansicht, das Vertrauen zu den Lehrern und der Glaube an die Bildungseinrichtungen seien 
unabdingbare Bedingungen für deren einwandfreies Funktionieren. Dieser Glaube beharrt dar­
auf, die (Bildungs)einrichtungen als Paradigmen zu begreifen. Der Autor schlussfolgert, die 
Umsetzung der nicht intelligenten Verantwortlichkeit innerhalb der Bildung sei ein gewichtiger 
Faktor zum Aufbau des ökonomistischen Modells der Bildung, das sich jedoch als inkompatibel 
mit der personalistischen Vorstellung der Bildung und der Gesellschaft im Allgemeinen erweist. 





Confiance, responsabilité et enseignement supérieur
Résumé
Les sujets principaux de cet article sont deux phénomènes qui jouent un rôle important dans 
l’enseignement supérieur (moderne) : la responsabilité et la confiance. L’auteur affirme que 
nous ne devrions pas faire preuve de n’importe quelle forme de responsabilité, mais unique­
ment d’une responsabilité intelligente. L’objectif de cet article est d’apporter une contribution 
à la connaissance de la responsabilité intelligente. Dans ce cadre, l’auteur vise à mettre en 
lumière l’importance cruciale de la confiance dans la culture d’une responsabilité intelligente, 
la « dialectique » entre la confiance et la responsabilité, ainsi que l’importance d’une juste 
compréhension de l’université. Il affirme que la confiance dans les enseignants et la foi dans 
les institutions d’enseignement sont une condition nécessaire à leur bon fonctionnement. Cette 
foi nous demande de comprendre les institutions d’enseignement comme paradigmes. L’auteur 
conclut que l’application d’une responsabilité non­intelligente dans l’enseignement est un fac­
teur important de développement du modèle économiciste de l’enseignement, incompatible avec 
une vision personnaliste de l’enseignement et de la société dans l’ensemble. Par conséquent, 
nous devrions refuser son application.
Mots-clés
responsabilité	(non)intelligente,	confiance,	enseignement	supérieur,	institutions	comme	paradigmes,	
foi	dans	les	institutions,	modèle	d’enseignement	économiciste,	enseignement	personnaliste
